Suchergebnisse

The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose fines for lying and the inappropriate use of arbitration - can be used to render payoff-relevant observable information verifiable. Thus, if SPI mechanisms work as predicted they undermine the foundations of important economic results based on the observable but non-verifiable assumption. Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of SPI mechanisms is, however, scarce. In this paper we show experimentally that SPI mechanisms have severe behavioral limitations. They induce retaliation against legitimate uses of arbitration and thus make the parties reluctant to trigger arbitration. The inconsistent use of arbitration eliminates the incentives to take first-best actions and leads to costly disagreements such that individuals - if given the choice - opt out of the mechanism in the majority of the cases. Incentive compatible redesigns of the mechanism solve some of these problems but generate new ones such that the overall performance of the redesigned mechanisms remains low. Our results indicate that there is little hope for SPI mechanisms to solve verifiability problems unless they are made retaliation-proof and, more generally, robust to other-regarding preferences.

Most economic models are based on the self-interest hypothesis that assumes that all people are exclusively motivated by their material self-interest. In recent years experimental economists have gathered overwhelming evidence that systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis and suggests that many people are strongly motivated by concerns for fairness and reciprocity. Moreover, several theoretical papers have been written showing that the observed phenomena can be explained in a rigorous and tractable manner. These theories in turn induced a new wave of experimental research offering additional exciting insights into the nature of preferences and into the relative performance of competing theories of fairness. The purpose of this paper is to review these recent developments, to point out open questions, and to suggest avenues for future research.

We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral hazard context. Incentive contracts that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are concerned about fairness. Conversely, contracts that are doomed to fail when there are only selfish actors provide powerful incentives and become superior when there are also fair-minded players. These predictions are strongly supported by the results of a series of experiments. Furthermore, our results suggest that the existence of fair actors may be an important reason why many contracts are left deliberately incomplete.

"Üblicherweise wird davon ausgegangen, daß die Arbeitsnachfrage negativ vom Reallohn abhängt. In diesem Kurzbeitrag wird gezeigt, daß höhere Reallöhne auch niedrigere Grenzkosten der Arbeit und eine höhere Arbeitsnachfrage verursachen können. Dieses überraschende Resultat wird abgeleitet im Rahmen der Trainingskostenvariante der Effizienzlohnhypothese - welche von Stiglitz, Schlicht und Salop entwickelt wurde. Dieses Modell stellt auch einen geeigneten Rahmen für die Analyse der Beschäftigungseffekte von Gewerkschaften dar, weil sich damit sowohl die Monopol- als auch die Mitbestimmungseffekte der Gewerkschaften analysieren lassen. Im Gegensatz zur vorherrschenden Meinung impliziert das Modell, daß Gewerkschaften höhere Löhne und eine höhere Beschäftigung hervorrufen können." (Autorenreferat)

"Vergleicht man eine Wirtschaft mit Gewerkschaften mit dem Lehrbuchmodell einer utopischen Marktwirtschaft, dann sind die Gewerkschaften auf alle Fälle effizienzsenkende Institutionen, Berücksichtigt man hingegen die unvermeidlichen und teilweise selbst durch Effizienzgründe bedingten Abweichungen realer kapitalistischer Marktwirtschaften vom Modell der utopischen Marktwirtschaft, dann können Gewerkschaften eine effizienzsteigernde Rolle spielen, indem sie die Arbeitnehmer vor ineffizient schlechten Arbeitsbedingungen schützen. Es wird auch gezeigt, daß höhere Reallöhne - aus rein angebotseitigen Gründen - zu mehr Beschäftigung führen können." (Autorenreferat)